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At the centre of this essay lies a reconsideration o f an elusive spirit lurking amid the 
conventional classical, medieval, and Renaissance gestures of Sir Philip Sidney’s Apol- 
ojjiefor Poetrie. This underlying principle in the Sidneyan strategy seems also to ani­
mate other “defensive” interventions in the history of English poetics, and the mosdy 
unspoken or unspeakable grounds for poetry’s traditionally privileged place at the 
centre of a liberal education. It may accordingly have implications for our ambiva­
lence today about the “uses” of literature in a world (and an academic profession) 
renewing—yet again—the same pattern of impatient suspicion and adroidy evasive 
apologia.
My reason for dedicating to Douglas Wurtele this short excursion in literary and 
educational theory is in large measure personal. One morning in the mid-1960’s 
Douglas converted me, as sullenly philistine a youth as ever was, to English litera­
ture. And, in particular, to the study of poetry. It happened early in a compulsory 
first-year course in Douglas’ own first year of full-time university teaching. The reve­
lation occurred as we concluded our readings in Middle English from Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales. We paused over the author’s later “retraccioun”1—his famous 
deathbed repudiation, on moral and religious grounds, of a lifetime’s literary effort 
(“enditynges of worldly vanitees”). With more a nudge than a wink, Douglas 
acknowledged en passant that this manner of leave-taking might (or might not) have
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been partly or wholly conventional, having numerous precedents, and being multiple 
or undecidable in tone, “intention,” or historical status. If so, it might (or might not) 
invite and reward the same sort o f dramatic interpretation afforded Chaucer’s many 
ironic invocations elsewhere of presumably-familiar tropes, devices, and genres from 
classical or medieval rhetoric, poetics, and piety. I was enthralled by the hint that 
there could after all be something important, needful, and deliciously “dangerous” 
(and yet moral in some ampler sense) in the maddening obliqueness o f literature and 
literariness; in their ambiguous mode o f relation to a prepossessing world o f practi­
cal action, and to ideological and institutional authority, even with respect to “thilke 
that sownen into synne.”
In the texts we call “literary” or “poetic”—in which we find human experience 
most searchingly, yet uninsistendy, observed in self-disclosing symbolic actions—are 
the springs o f re-imagining ourselves and of individual and social change. In all eras 
this potential has been condemned, discouraged, or belitded by interests resistant to 
change or plurality. At the same time, it is also always being enlisted on behalf o f one 
or another particular articulation of change. Both tendencies misconceive or prefer to 
ignore the paradoxical manner o f poetry’s disengaged, even dramatic, manner of 
affording readers themselves the opportunity for imaginative engagement and critical 
judgment—moral, political, or otherwise. Poetry’s own emphasis on mimesis and 
poiesis and drama—representation and making and action—is an eschewing of reduc­
ible statement, exhortation, or serviceable abstraction, an indifference to pronounc­
ing the meanings o f its own showings. Such opaqueness—in Sidney’s phrase, “the 
Poet, he nothing affirmes” (52)—is what disappoints mistaken expectations o f refer- 
entiality.2
From ancient times to the present, debate over the nature and value of poetry 
has eddied around the same two or three implicit issues, altered only incidentally'by 
shifts in cultural circumstances. Plus pa change, plus c’est la même chose? To dwell insis­
tently on historical and semantic differences among the literary Zeitgeists o f the clas­
sical, medieval, Renaissance humanist, romantic, modernist, and post-modernist 
periods is to disperse our sense o f radical continuities o f concern and of “generic” 
strategy persisting today. Objections to valuing literary discourse have always origi­
nated in anxiety about the “moral” and “practical” implications o f its distracting fic- 
tionality. The subject matter o f literature is patendy imaginary—untruthful—and its
affecting manner therefore dangerously conducive to sympathy with fanciful, delu­
sive, profidess, or licentious thought or conduct. The unworldly philosopher must 
needs deplore wayward poetry’s beautiful falsities, the vigilant cleric its libertine 
temptations from “moralitee and devocioun,” and the pragmatic utilitarian its waste­
ful uselessness.
And yet poetry’s detractors also seem to take it for granted that the difference 
between literary and other forms o f verbal discourse must be one o f degree rather 
than of kind. In order to deny poetry any privileged status or perspective, it must be 
classified as a branch o f rhetoric or oratory, distinguishable only in incidentals from 
instrumental (and professedly moral) varieties of didactic referential exposition or 
effective persuasion. After all, the idle literary falsehoods would not otherwise be 
considered worth attacking, or poetry’s influence pernicious. Here lies the disso­
nance haunting the charges brought against literature through the centuries. Poetry 
cannot logically be both elegant irrelevant trifling and an instance o f language’s 
power to promote or disturb the stability of customary or authorised social values. 
Indeed, the hostility or impatience of poetry’s enemies turns out to be primarily 
ideological, not moral. The real disagreement is not over relative truthfulness or use­
fulness. It is the monologic hegemony’s resentment of dialogic mischief, of an only 
ironic compliance, o f destabilised or multiplied values, of inclusive imaginings of 
humanity and humaneness at variance with the controlling authority of its own sta­
tus, meanings, and purposes.
But the same aporia persists in the defences as well, confirming the sanctioning 
authority o f those values. Although moral efficacy or persuasive advocacy is never 
advanced as the distinguishing essence of poetry, neither do Sidneys successors dare 
expressly to disavow so expedient a misconnection with the “useful” arts o f elo­
quence. The generic retort upon suspicion of the moral or practical utility of poetry 
is to explain that ideally it does impart the desiderated qualities o f knowledge, virtue, 
and common sense, albeit by vividly depicting exemplary images and actions instead 
of advancing data, precepts, testimony, syllogisms, or enthymemes. Still, careful 
reading of most defences of poetry, including that o f Horace, indicates that the 
prominent dulce et utile formulation is actually advanced as a secondary consider­
ation, after the fact, not as an essential motive or necessary effect in literature.
Sidney’s eclectic manifesto, An Apologiefor Poetrie (cl580), is often cited as a model 
restatement o f the moral argument for literature. In fact, it affords us an example of 
how ambivalent that line o f “defence” can actually be. Eager to revitalise a moribund 
and pedantic national literature, Sidney nevertheless felt constrained to reiterate too, 
as far as he honesdy could, a mainly utilitarian and moral rationale for its encourage­
ment. He accordingly includes—indeed, features—a virtuoso rehearsal of classical 
and medieval and sixteenth-century pleadings that the moral instructiveness o f litera­
ture is enhanced by its delightfulness. That few of these concepts were novelties was 
noted in assiduous contemporary analyses like that of Sir William Temple, and has 
been confirmed in countless scholarly articles. It is in those respects a debonaire pas­
tiche o f mosdy Platonic, Aristotelian, Horatian, and Ciceronian principles, with 
traces o f later continental and English thought on discourse and learning. And it is so 
charmingly (if not seamlessly) assembled as to cast a kind of rosy harmonising haze 
over a deliberately “generic” performance that is in more muted matters of detail and 
implication also a radical utterance. Sidney’s whole strategy is, I believe, to confirm 
the indirecdy (or potentially) edifying value o f poetry while subdy dissociating its 
quiddity from that o f rhetoric. In so doing, he implicidy aligns the lying poets, pace 
Plato, with the truth-seeking philosophers in their ancient rivalry with rhetoricians.
Sidney is, in fact, persistendy uneasy about avowing that poetic discourse 
direcdy “teaches” anything o f paraphrasable meaning or worth, or that its moral 
bearings can be discerned or valued as “instructive” in the referential, intentional, 
informative, practical way o f preaching, ethical philosophy, or even history-writing. 
In fact, he says that to be “wrapped within the folde of the proposed subiect,” or to 
look merely for a way of “sweedy uttering” any fixed “knowledge” (including mat­
ters philosophical or moral) is to be not “right Poets” (27). Right poetry cannot be 
the delivering forth o f preset themes, supposed facts, doxa, or even prescribable sub­
ject matter. That would be at best rhetoric, at worst propaganda. Presumably, then, 
the right poet means or hopes in some sense to edify, but not to teach any doctrine 
in particular. Similarly, the presence o f pleasing style, figurative language, pathos, 
personification, fables, and other formal and technical diversions is not a reliable 
note o f right literature. Nothing is commoner, he points out, than to see these meth­
ods employed by writers and orators for manipulative advantage. And, when he goes 
on to mock the sophistries and hypocrisies—not just the dullness—of moral philoso­
phers, Sidney seems again to confirm that right poetry must be understood as
“instructive” in some vastly more subtle sense. Not just indirectly, or in a higher 
degree, but differendy.
Sidney carefully (if unobtrusively) separates incisive remarks on the nature of 
poetry from his more numerous but blander comments on its possible moral bene­
fits. Literature is above all mimetic—it apprehends and re-presents, creating a living 
mental image (picture) in words (26-7). If  Aristode had seemed to say that some­
thing natural is imitated, and Plato something imagined, Sidney is again mainly with 
Plato, if only to insist that poetic representation does not purport to copy or mirror 
actualities. “The poet nothing affirmeth.” Nor does the Apolojjie suggest that the pro­
cess or product of mimesis is in itself instructive or that it carries or produces mean­
ing. The immediate end and effect of mimesis is in fact said to be not meaning nor 
understanding but delight—both the poet’s joy in what is being imagined and the 
reader’s pleasure, whether the same or different, in contemplating the imitation pro­
duced. The delight is described by Sidney in sensory metaphors—sound and sight— 
the mind’s ear and the mind’s eye.
Closely associated with the delight (or with its intensity) is energeia (67)—the 
power by which delight animates the writer and the reader in some way or other— 
the moving force that draws or pushes, or can “strike, pierce” or “possesse” them 
(33), stirring them to action or the desire for action. Again, however, being moved 
into this state of excitation or seeking does not appear to be educational in itsel£ The 
emphasis is entirely on “strange effects” (41) on mind and emotion and will. Indeed 
Sidney emphasises that “mooving is of a higher degree then teaching” (39). Delight­
ful mimesis (literature?) moves us by its very nature, not otherwise: there is “no law 
but wit” (27). At most, we are moved into a condition o f mind hospitable to or 
desirous of an infusion of moral reflections on richly suggestive picturings o f experi­
ence, but, by the same logic, we are just as open to the influence of evil ideas and bad 
examples. This obvious flaw in the teaching-by-delight defence is further acknowl­
edged in the Apologias invoking that other generic caveat that the abuse of a good 
thing should not condemn its right use. To the extent that Sidney considers instruc­
tion or teaching a function o f literature, then, it is as something more subde and 
uncertain than commonly supposed.
In a famous sentence Sidney hints (without explicidy claiming) that the power 
o f literature may energise “our erected wit [that] maketh vs know what perfection 
is,” even though “our infected will keepeth vs from reaching vnto it” (26). But he is 
afterwards honest enough to ascribe such a function to all learning, not just to litera­
ture. Nor can poetry be said to be alone in transcending the sciences o f “well know­
ing” and concerning itself also with “well dooing” (30). Sidney acknowledges at 
some length that historians and philosophers are strong rivals in this regard although 
poetry may by its nature be a better mover than either. O f course, poetry is at an 
advantage here only in pleasurableness, not in morality.
Things cohere better if the Apologie is understood to be assigning all (or almost 
all) the responsibility for literature’s instructiveness or practicality to readers them­
selves. The key evidence here is in the sinewy remark that even as readers looking in 
History books for truth “goe away full fraught with falsehood: so in Poesie, looking 
for fiction, they shall vse the narration but as an imaginatiue groundplot o f a profit­
able inuention.” Does Sidney not mean here that inventing (invenire, finding) any­
thing profitable is, frankly, the reader’s or critic’s task and prerogative? That herein, if 
anywhere, is the possible use o f a frankly imaginative narration? That the unexpected­
ness o f discovering some profitable insight for oneself, by reading a fiction, is some­
how a better education (e-ducing) than looking for general “truth” in didactic 
discourses wrongly claiming to inculcate it direcdy? If so, a right poem is stricdy 
“imaginative”—not rhetorical—offering nothing beyond a stimulating “groundplot” 
that may or may not activate a reader’s own “invention” towards a moral, useful, or 
otherwise “profitable” ethos and praxis.
Why might such a text, so produced and so employed, be more edifying than, 
say, history or philosophy? Presumably by calling more energetically into play a 
wider range o f mental and emotional responsiveness, and by extending almost infi­
nitely the variety and nature o f imaginable actions, characters, and situations. In 
other words, by exercising and cultivating all our intellectual faculties, in exacdy the 
manner John Henry Newman described in identifying a liberal university education 
with “knowledge for its own sake,” that is, for the sake o f the mind itself, free for the 
time being from any ulterior consideration o f moral, social, technical, or professional 
utility. In The Idea of a University, Newman conceded that the product o f a right edu­
cation o f this sort might not necessarily be a moral, pious, useful citizen. Education
is one good thing, morality another. As for utility, “though the useful is not always 
good, the good is always useful.”3
Sidney seems to have valued literature in like terms, as a liberating and inform­
ing discourse, and, in the first instance, for its own sake. Such a view can never 
appeal widely, or to the officialdom o f the status quo, or even to other writers, theo­
rists, and critics for whom individual and social responsibility (and inclusive breadth 
of appeal?) are concerns that cannot in good conscience remain so oblique or uncer­
tain. Like most other “defences,” his Apologie for Poetrie is a strategic compromise, 
not so much a feigned as a realistically equivocal or partial defence of didactic literary 
theory. It illustrates learned, graceful accommodation with the more or less domi­
nant cultural discourses, in any age, o f pragmatism and piety. He was, after all, an 
active public figure and a puritan himself, just as Newman the secular liberal in edu­
cation was also a vehement apologist for religious orthodoxy. In each case, the rhe­
torical challenge in daring to affirm the practicality o f impractical things was to 
harmonise overdetermined discordancies in a mixed audience, while still dexterously 
respecting actual differences between unlike things.
Such honest, tactful clarity is always needful, perhaps especially so at our own 
moment and situation in the perennial negotiation o f dissonances about literature 
and higher education. Understanding and support o f academic literary study and 
scholarship has diminished lately, for die usual reason: our supposed impracticality. 
Coincidentally or not, many within the discipline are turning back to moral (politi­
cally engaged) imperatives in austere reconceptions o f literature and critical work. 
Plus pa change ?
In so hectic a generation, Douglas Wurtele’s has been a voice o f informed clarity 
and balance. Like his beloved Chaucer, Douglas has always contemplated with criti­
cal geniality life’s (and institutions’) follies and knaveries. And like the Clerk of 
Oxenford, he has treasured, embodied, and generously enlarged “lerning” and 
“heigh sentence,” yet “Gladly wolde he...teche” (20). As a respected scholar, as an 
award-winning teacher, as a skilful editor, and as a beloved friend, he has been 
consistendy liberal, humane, and educational in the fullest sense o f the word. Rarely 
is so rigorous a knowledge of poetry’s engagement with political, religious, ethical, 
psychological, and philosophical subjects or questions combined with so joyous an
affirmation o f the dramatic openness of its symbolic representation o f intellectual, 
social, and moral experience. To use his own phrase, Douglas Wurtele has “opened 
out” for all o f us many an imaginative groundplot for many a profitable invention.
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